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Accounting-Based Asset Return Smoothing
in Participating Life Annuities: Implications
for Annuitants, Insurers, and Policymakers
Raimond Maurer, Olivia S. Mitchell, Ralph Rogalla,
and Ivonne Siegelin

Insurance companies offering variable life annuity products have been
permitted to report asset values in their income statements at historical
cost instead of fair market values, under current accounting standards.1
They are also allowed to report their liabilities using actuarial smoothing,
rather than marking them to market. Little is known about the economic
consequences of these practices, despite the fact that the accounting rules
play a key role for understanding the life insurance industry. They are
important since smoothing allows insurers to defer losses; of course when
they sell assets to pay beneﬁts, the losses must be realized, which can trigger
large reductions in beneﬁt payments. Smoothing also allows them to defer
gains, such that when gains are realized, beneﬁts can increase due to the
ﬁrms having a contingency reserve.
These practices have come under criticism of late, in view of the persistent
low interest rate environment and the loss of transparency that such practices imply (e.g., Jorgensen 2004; Bleck and Liu 2007; Ng and Schism 2010).
Yet moving to fair market valuation of insurer assets and liabilities would
introduce new volatility into the insurers’ balance sheets, which could
undermine proﬁtability and decimate the appeal of retirement annuities.
This chapter outlines the conditions under which smoothing can be beneﬁcial for policyholders who hold with-proﬁt or participating payout life annuities
(PLAs). These are bought by retirees expecting to receive a guaranteed
beneﬁt for life, along with variable non-guaranteed payments that depend
on investment returns and mortality experiences of the insurance pool
(Maurer et al. 2013b). Our objective is to show how accounting smoothing
affects the risk and return proﬁles of PLA payouts as well as insurer
proﬁtability. We investigate these patterns using a model of a participating
life annuity that draws on the TIAA Traditional Annuity.2 We demonstrate
that such accounting techniques can actually be welfare-enhancing, since
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risk-averse consumers can beneﬁt substantially when insurers smooth asset
and longevity surprises.

A Brief Overview of Life Insurance
Accounting Smoothing
Under US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP),
company-held assets can be categorized as those held to maturity, those
held for trading purposes, or assets available for sale (Herget et al. 2008).
Assets held to maturity should be valued at amortized cost when acquired
(historical cost valuation, or HCV); in this instance, asset price changes are
recognized as gains or losses only when the instruments are sold. Assets held
for trading purposes are to be reported at fair market value (FMV), so price
changes immediately affect insurer proﬁts (whether they are realized or
not). Under US GAAP, this is the default for valuing stock holdings. Assets
available for sale are also reported at FMV, but unrealized gains and losses
resulting from market price ﬂuctuations are not reported in the insurer’s
proﬁt and loss statement (P&L). Instead, they are carried in a separate
account on the liability side of the insurer’s balance sheet, known as the
Other Comprehensive Income account (OCI). When these assets are sold,
the OCI account is reversed, and realized gains or losses are recorded in
the P&L. This approach is the US GAAP default for the valuation of bond
holdings.
Formally, under the simplifying assumption that assets can only be sold at
the end of each period, investment gains gt;tþ1 over the period ½t; t þ 1 on
an asset can be calculated according to:
ɡFMV
t;tþ1 ¼ nt ðStþ1  St Þ þ nt Dt;tþ1

ð1Þ

when reporting at fair market value. Here, nt represents the number of the
assets held at time t, St refers to the assets’ market price at time t, and Dt;tþ1 is
the cash distribution received per asset over the period ½t; t þ 1 (e.g., coupon or dividend payments). Under historic cost valuation, when assets are
sold at time t þ 1 (i.e. ntþ1  nt ), investment gains are given by:
ɡHCV
t;tþ1 ¼ ðnt  ntþ1 ÞðStþ1  S 0 Þ þ nt Dt;tþ1

ð2Þ

where S 0 represents the initial purchase price of the asset.
Most US life insurers do not follow US GAAP, however. Instead, they rely
on the statutory accounting principles issued by the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). These are speciﬁc accounting guidelines
for insurers that permit the companies to value their bond portfolios in their
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annual statements using a historical cost approach.3 This has been the
preferred practice as it helps protect insurers’ balance sheets and income
statements against short-term capital market volatility. In the context of a
participating life insurance product, this accounting smoothing has direct
implications for the beneﬁt stream received by the policyholders, since
surpluses to be shared with the annuitants are conventionally computed
only using realized gains and losses.
To illustrate the impact of accounting-based payout smoothing, we
describe a stylized insurance provider offering single-premium participating
life annuity contracts. The world in which this insurer operates includes
capital market risk, systematic longevity risk, and idiosyncratic mortality risk.
In such an environment, the insurer prices the annuity product using a
speciﬁc mortality table along with an assumed interest rate for discounting
beneﬁts (also called the guaranteed interest rate). The company then
generates surpluses in two ways: via investment returns and the annuitant
pool actual mortality. If the company’s return on the assets backing the
liability is greater than the guaranteed interest rate, and/or if realized
annuitant mortality exceeds what had been expected, the insurance company earns a surplus. The company can inﬂuence the expected risk and
return proﬁle of uncertain surplus payments by the choice of assets in its
portfolio. The non-guaranteed or participating surplus is set each year by
the insurer’s Board of Trustees.

A Simple Model of a Participating Life Annuity
Our model of a realistically-calibrated company for a pool of PLA policyholders with uncertain capital markets and mortality dynamics incorporates
the key institutional features outlined (more detail is provided in Maurer et al.
2014). Using this structure, we seek to examine how smoothing techniques
affect beneﬁt streams and the insurer’s proﬁtability and solvency. We assume
that the insurance company sells PLA contracts paying constant guaranteed
lifetime beneﬁts GB per annum to a closed pool of annuitants, all of the same
age. The liabilities resulting from the annuity promises are carried on the
insurer’s balance sheet as the Actuarial Reserve. In exchange for the promised beneﬁt stream, the ﬁrm collects annuity premiums that are calculated
based on the ﬁrm’s guaranteed interest rate GIR and actuarial survival tables.
The monies collected, which are carried on the insurer’s balance sheet as the
General Account, are then invested in a constant-mix portfolio of stocks and a
bond fund. Furthermore, we assume that the insurer is equipped with a
certain amount of equity in order to be able to cover potential losses from
the annuity business. The corresponding assets are assumed to be held in a
cash account. Table 3.1 summarizes the insurer’s balance sheet.
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TABLE 3.1.

The insurer’s balance sheet

Assets

Liabilities

General Account

Actuarial Reserve

► Stocks
► Bond Fund
Equity
► (OCI )
► Reserves

Cash

Note: General Account represents the PLA premiums collected.
Actuarial Reserve represents the liabilities corresponding to the
promised guaranteed lifelong beneﬁt stream. OCI (Other Comprehensive Income) represents unrealized gains/losses, applicable
only under OCI accounting.
Source: Authors’ representation.

Every year, the insurer pays policyholders out of its asset income as well as
from the sale of assets (sold at market prices). Annuitants receive the
guaranteed beneﬁt GB and, in addition to that, a positive participating
surplus payment if the insurer’s total stochastic investment return exceeds
its guaranteed interest rate, and if realized mortality, which is stochastic in both
mortality tables and individual mortality experience, exceeds expectation.
To assess how policyholders would value the stochastic PLA income
stream GB depending on their risk aversion and time preferences, we use
an expected utility framework. In particular we assume the consumer has a
time additive constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function:
"X
#
1γ
L
t
U ¼ E0
βt t p Px
ð3Þ
1γ
t

where β represents the time preference factor, γ the degree of relative
risk aversion, t p Px the individuals’ (subjective) survival probability, and Lt
the PLA beneﬁt received at time t. We then convert the expected lifetime
utility U from the PLA beneﬁt stream into a utility-equivalent ﬁxed life
annuity FLA (following Maurer et al. 2013b). This can be thought of as
the constant guaranteed lifetime income stream which will make the policyholder indifferent to the upside potential of a PLA with stochastic surpluses.

Calibration
We simulate 5,000 cases of the PLA sketched here for a pool of 10,000
equally aged males. The simulation starts with the annuity purchase at age
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65 and continues until the last individual in the pool has died. For the
illustration, we assume that the annuity pays a ﬁxed guaranteed income
stream GB of $10,000 for life, which, given sensible assumptions, requires
the purchaser to put up a single premium of $163,400. In addition to the
guaranteed annuity beneﬁt, the insurer promises to share 90 percent of
surpluses with the annuitants. The remaining 10 percent of surpluses are
cashed in by the insurer and increase its equity, which we initially set to
4 percent of the Actuarial Reserve. In case the ﬁrm’s equity is exhausted due
to adverse capital market or mortality shocks, surplus payments to the
annuitants are suspended until the equity has been replenished.
To model the stochastic returns on cash (i.e., the 1-year spot rate) and the
bond fund (target duration: 10 years), we rely on a 3-factor CIR model as in
Chen and Scott (1993), which we calibrate to US 3-month T-bill rates
and US Treasury zero yields (with maturities 1 to 10 years) over the period
01/1988–12/2012. Excess returns on stocks over the short-term interest rate
as well as dividend yields are based on S&P 500 data (12/1981–12/2012).
Annuitants are assumed to have identical time preference factors of β ¼
0:96 and coefﬁcients of relative risk aversion of γ ¼ 5. Survival probabilities
P
t p x are based on US mortality data as provided by the Human Mortality
Database (2014), which we develop stochastically over time using the
2-factor model of Cairns et al. (2006). Based on these rates, Bernoulli
experiments are conducted for each single individual in every period to
determine if said individual remains in the PLA pool for another period.
To study the implications of accounting smoothing for annuitant wellbeing and ﬁrm proﬁtability, we analyze 11 constant-mix asset allocations
(0–100 percent bonds in 10 percent steps) under ﬁve accounting regimes:
HCV only, FMV only, OCI only, US GAAP Default (Bond valuation: OCI;
Stock valuation: FMV), and NAIC Default (Bond valuation: HCV; Stock
valuation: FMV).

Key Results
To explore how alternative accounting regimes inﬂuence annuitant wellbeing, Panel A of Figure 3.1 depicts what beneﬁts a ﬁxed life annuity (FLA)
would need to provide, if it were to produce annuitant utility equal to that of
a PLA paying a ﬁxed annual beneﬁt of $10,000 plus a variable surplus given
different investment strategies. The three black lines (solid, dashed, and
dotted) illustrate what happens when all of the assets are evaluated according to a single valuation rule (HCV, FMV, OCI). The two gray lines (solid
and dashed) indicate results when stocks are valued at FMV, and bonds
according either to OCI (the US GAAP Default) or HCV (the NAIC Default).
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Figure 3.1 Effect of alternative valuation methods on PLA policyholder and insurer
outcomes
Notes: Panel A shows the utility equivalent ﬁxed life annuity (in $000) that generates the same
utility as a Participating Lifetime Annuity (PLA) with guaranteed initial lifelong annual beneﬁts of
$10,000 based on a time-additive CRRA utility function for alternative valuation scenarios. Panel
B shows the expected internal rate of return (IRR). FMV = fair market valuation, HCV = historical
cost valuation, OCI refers to other comprehensive income valuation, US GAAP Default = bond
valuation OCI and stock valuation FMV, NAIC Default = bond valuation HCV and stock valuation
FMV. Calibration: Male age 65 in 2013; initial guaranteed PLA beneﬁts: $10,000; time preference:
β = 0.96; relative risk aversion:γ = 5; GIR: 3%; mortality table: “Annuity 2000” (PLA present value
$163,400); bonds fund duration: 10 years; surplus allocation to annuitant: 90%.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text and Maurer et al. (2014).
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When the insurer invests only in bonds, the FLA is worth 9 percent more
under full HCV accounting (solid black line) than under the FMV method
(dashed black line); $12,069 vs. $11,052). Similar utility increases are
observed for other asset allocations. In other words, accounting smoothing
through historical cost valuation dominates fair market valuation from the
annuitant’s perspective. Moreover, under both of these single valuation
rules, the utility-maximizing bond fraction is about 50–60 percent—i.e.,
annuitants prefer a diversiﬁed portfolio allocation for the assets backing
their PLA.
The ﬁxed lifetime annuity under OCI (dotted black line) is worth more
than with FMV, between 3.5 and 7.5 percent. Here, unrealized gains/losses
do not directly affect the surplus under OCI, which results in lower
undesired volatility in surplus payments. Despite that, unrealized losses do
reduce the insurer’s equity and through this channel may reduce the
allocation of surplus to the annuitant. This explains why the utilityequivalent FLA is up to about 5.5 percent lower than under pure HCV
(solid black line).
It is not surprising that under the two mixture approaches, the (gray)
utility-equivalent value curves of the affected policyholder lie between the
two extremes. As stocks are valued at FMV under US GAAP defaults, US
GAAP (solid gray line) and FMV produce the same outcomes at low bond
allocations. By contrast, for high bond fractions, US GAAP valuations are
similar to those obtained with OCI. We observe similar results for NAIC
valuation (dashed gray line): for a low bond allocation, results are similar to
FMV, while at a high bond percent the pattern tracks that of the HCV
approach. Moreover, the NAIC technique provides more value to the annuitant than the US GAAP methodology, because the former protects the
policyholder from asset volatility with additional smoothing.
Next we take the insurer’s perspective to study how alternative asset
valuation methods impact the internal rate of return (IRR) on capital
provided by the insurer’s shareholders. Speciﬁcally, we compute the
expected IRR over our 5,000 simulation paths, accounting for the initial
equity investment, potential periodic dividend distributions to the shareholders over the lifetime of the annuity, and what the investors receive at the
end of the product’s lifespan, namely the value of equity capital and any
actuarial reserves that remain when the last annuitant dies. The time horizon for each of the 5,000 simulation runs depends on the stochastic time of
death of the last annuitant.
Panel B of Figure 3.1 plots the expected internal rates of return as a
function of the insurer’s asset allocation and the accounting regime in
place. Again, the three black lines (solid, dashed, and dotted) describe the
scenarios with a single valuation rule (HCV, FMV, OCI); the two gray lines
refer the US GAAP (solid) and the NAIC (dashed) Default rules.
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Comparing the solid and the dashed black lines, we see that insurers
would prefer HCV over FMV for all portfolio compositions, due to higher
expected internal rates of return. Moreover, IRRs under HCV are strictly
positive, ranging from 3 to 4 percent depending on the asset allocation. By
contrast, expected IRRs resulting from FMV are negative for both the allstock and all-bond allocations (10 and 0.5 percent, respectively), and
only slightly positive for bond allocations of 50–90 percent. Under FMV,
surpluses will be paid to the policyholders even if gains are unrealized. At
the same time, unrealized losses will not be borne by the annuitants. This is
in contrast to the HCV, where unrealized gains and losses may offset over
time. The asymmetric impact of value ﬂuctuations on payment streams also
results in IRRs generally increasing with the bond share, as these generate
less volatile asset returns.
Expected IRRs under OCI (dotted black line) generally exceed those
under HCV (solid black line) for the majority of asset allocations, as unrealized losses can result in lower surplus payments. This increases the ﬁrm’s
potential to retain more returns and hence improves IRRs.
For the default valuation methods of US GAAP (solid gray line) and the
NAIC (dashed gray line), expected IRRs represent weighted averages of the
IRRs under FMV and OCI or under FMV and HCV. Overall, for realistic
asset allocations, US GAAP Defaults will result in higher expected insurer
proﬁtability.
In summary, when looking at reasonable asset allocations, smoothing
capital market return ﬂuctuations via accounting techniques is attractive
for PLA policyholders as well as for insurers. In particular, investing heavily
in bonds combined with valuing assets based on historic costs produces
stable returns, and, consequently, the costs for the guarantees embedded
in the PLA contracts are low. Given a preference for stable PLA payouts over
time, policyholders will approve of these conservative investment and valuation strategies.

Conclusion
As we have shown, policyholders seeking a guaranteed beneﬁt plus some
upside potential can beneﬁt greatly from participating payout annuities,
which help smooth some of the systematic shocks due to capital market
uncertainty as well as systematic and idiosyncratic longevity risk. Our realistically-calibrated model of this product demonstrates how alternative
accounting techniques inﬂuence policyholder welfare as well as insurer
proﬁtability and stability. Our ﬁndings indicate that smoothing in the case
of participating life annuities is favorable to consumers and insurers. That is,
it mitigates the potentially unduly large impact of short-term volatility on
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long-term contracts such as annuities. Therefore, smoothing is beneﬁcial for
risk-averse annuitants and proﬁtable for insurers.
This implies that the current debate about whether to push insurance
companies to undertake fair market valuation is not merely about rules—
the answer to the question will have real ﬁnancial impacts. As such, our work
is related to the general discussion about advantages and disadvantages of
HCV vs. FMV methods in the accounting literature (see, e.g., Busillo et al.
2016; Ellul et al. 2013; Laux and Leuz 2009, 2010).
Our chapter is also related to studies of household portfolio choice and
annuitization which have primarily focused on ﬁxed payout annuities,
where capital market and mortality risks are solely borne by the insurer.
Only a limited number of studies has examined unit-linked annuities which
allow the insurer to share investment and longevity risk with the policyholder (see, e.g., Piggott et al. 2005; Denuit et al. 2011; Richter and Weber
2011; Maurer et al. 2013a). Based on those studies and our ﬁndings here, we
believe that participating annuities offer retirees a favorable combination of
access to the mortality credit and a smoothed payout stream for life.
Our results should be of interest to policymakers seeking to strengthen
ﬁnancial security in old age by optimizing the management of 401(k) plan
drawdown, for example through stimulating growth in the annuity market.4
Pushing annuity providers toward fair market valuation and away from the
historic cost approach might improve information disclosure for the companies’ current and future shareholders. Yet it could also reduce the attractiveness of PLA products for both policyholders and insurance companies.

Endnotes
1. This chapter draws on and simpliﬁes our related study (Maurer et al. 2014).
2. TIAA-CREF in 2012 held 3.6 million annuity contracts and managed assets of
$487B. The TIAA Traditional Annuity builds up capital during the accumulation
phase, whereby contributions paid by policyholders earn a minimum guaranteed
yearly interest rate (depending on the vintage when premiums are paid) plus a
non-guaranteed surplus. Here we concentrate only on the liquidation phase of
the product. In the European market, participating life annuity products are also
on offer, comparable to the TIAA product outlined in the text; see Maurer et al.
(2013b).
3. Lombardi (2009) offers additional information on valuation requirements. Also,
under NAIC rules, insurers may discount the liabilities resulting from the guaranteed beneﬁt with a ﬁxed interest rate speciﬁed at the beginning of the contract
(i.e., the guaranteed interest rate). See for instance TIAA-CREF (2011).
4. As the senior advisor to the US Secretary of the Treasury and Deputy Assistant
Secretary for retirement and health policy, Mark Iwry, noted: ‘One solution is to
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provide for a predictable lifetime stream of income, such as an annuity provided
under a retirement plan or IRA. By pooling those who live shorter and longer
than average, everybody can essentially put away what’s necessary to reach the
average life expectancy, and those who live longer than average will be protected’
(Steverman 2012).
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